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INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
A public service announcement used to proclaim "friends don't let friends drive 
drunk" in an effort to make young adults feel responsible for preventing their peers from 
driving while intoxicated. But this television PSA did not address a common situation, in 
which a group of friends are all drinking and all planning to ride in a car together. In such 
situations, what kinds of decisions do young adults make, who feels responsible for making 
the decision, and who feels responsible for the outcome of the decision? The present study 
will address these issues, arguing that diminished responsibility leads to riskier attitudes 
about drinking and driving. 
Despite years of educational attempts such as the aforementioned public service 
announcement, driving under the influence (DUI) remains a serious problem among young 
adults. Although the DUI rate among young adults has decreased over time, it still remains 
relatively high, with almost 20% of high school seniors reporting performing this behavior in 
the previous two weeks (O'Malley & Johnston, 1999). It is estimated that almost 10 million 
drunk driving episodes occur annually among adults aged 18 to 20 (Liu et al., 1997). The 
relative risk for alcohol-related crash involvement is greater among younger drivers than 
among older drivers, regardless of blood alcohol levels (Thombs, 1999). In the young adult 
population, drunk drivers are rarely alone in the car. In one study of teen-aged drunk drivers, 
82% reported transporting at least one passenger, with groups of 4 or more not uncommon 
(Vegega & Klitzner, 1989). A recent survey found that two-thirds of college students had 
ridden with an intoxicated driver in the past year (Thombs, 1999). Among high school 
seniors, the problem is even more prevalent: 26.1 % report riding with an intoxicated driver 
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in the past two weeks (O'Malley & Johnston, 1999). Despite the pervasiveness of this 
problem, group decision-making as it relates to DUI has seldom been the subject of study. 
The current study will examine attitudes about DUI by looking at the effects social 
influence and responsibility attributions have on risk attitudes. The group risk-taking 
literature is large, but tends to focus primarily on the effects of social influence. The current 
study will also focus on attributions of responsibility when in a group. The general 
hypothesis is that groups of young adults, especially passengers, are prone to decisions 
favoring driving after drinking because the social nature of decision-making and the passive 
role of the passenger lead to diminished perceptions ofresponsibility. The review ofrelevant 
literature will concentrate on an overview of the research on health-risk attitudes and 
responsibility as it applies to groups and driving. 
Rational Health-Risk Models 
Two of the most prominent theories of the relation between attitudes and behaviors 
are the theory of reasoned action and its successor, the theory of planned behavior. The 
theory of reasoned action posits that attitudes and perceived social norms about behaviors 
combine to create intentions, which ultimately determine the actual performance of behaviors 
(Fishbein & Ajzen, 197 5). The concept of intention to perform a behavior presupposes that 
the behavior is a conscious choice; people perform behaviors because they decide, or intend, 
to do so. Asking participants if they intend to perform a particular risk behavior within a 
specific time frame is the typical operationalization of intention. The theory of planned 
behavior was developed to increase the theory of reasoned action's predictive ability by 
adding the concept of perceived behavioral control, the belief that orie can actually perform 
the behavior, as another variable that influences intention (Ajzen, 1991). Researchers 
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operationalize the theory of planned behavior by asking the likelihood, or expectation, of 
performing a given behavior. 
The theories of reasoned action and planned behavior have been criticized because 
their success in predicting health-impairing behaviors in young adults has been mixed 
(Gibbons, Gerrard, Blanton, & Russell, 1998). Likewise, it has been argued that these 
theories are less applicable to complex as opposed to simple behaviors, particularly socially 
undesirable behaviors (Beck & Ajzen, 1991 ), those that are spontaneous (Kippax & 
Crawford, 1993), and social behaviors that require the involvement of others (Eagly & 
Chaiken, 1993). An obvious example of a complex, socially undesirable, spontaneous 
behavior that often involves others is driving after one has been drinking. 
Prototype/Willingness Model of Health Risk 
Expanding on the theories of reasoned action and planned behavior, Gibbons, 
Gerrard, and their colleagues have developed the prototype/willingness model (Gibbons & 
Gerrard, 1995, 1997; Gibbons, Gerrard, & Lane, in press; Gibbons, Gerrard, Blanton, & 
Russell, 1998; Gibbons, Gerrard, Ouellete, & Burzette, 1998), which was designed 
specifically to address health-related risk behaviors in adolescents and young adults. The 
model focuses on the social and situational nature of risk behaviors and the important role 
peers play in young adults' lives. It assumes that there are two tracks that lead to risk 
behavior: reasoned action, which proceeds through the proximal antecedent of intention, and 
social reaction, which proceeds through a second proximal antecedent termed behavioral 
willingness. According to this model, young adults often engage in risk behaviors, despite 
their expressed intentions not to do so, because they are reacting to social situations. The 
4 
prototype/willingness model adds two aspects to the theory of reasoned action: behavioral 
willingness, and the related concept of risk images ( or prototypes). 
Willingness and prototypes. Behavioral willingness is defined as an openness to 
engage in behavior if and when the opportunity arises. Because health-related risk behaviors 
are primarily social behaviors, individuals' images of the typical person who engages in the 
behaviors and their tendency to socially compare with others are important antecedents to 
behavioral willingness. By engaging in a particular risk behavior, young people know they 
will be associated with the characteristics of the typical person who engages in that behavior. 
For example, youth who binge drink take on the image of the typical binge drinker as a 
consequence of their behavior. The more acceptable the image, the more willing people will 
be to engage in the behavior. Willingness is typically operationalized by asking participants 
to imagine being in a specific risk-conducive situation and then asking them to indicate how 
willing they would be to perform the risk behavior. 
Willingness versus intention. Compared with intention, willingness is characterized 
by a lack of forethought and less commitment. Individuals who are high in willingness often 
have not seriously considered the implications and consequences of risk behaviors, because 
they were not planning on doing them (Gerrard, Gibbons, Reis-Bergan, Trudeau, & Buunk, 
2001). If the "right" (i.e. risk-conducive) circumstances present themselves, however, some 
young adults will respond by engaging in behaviors they had not originally intended to do. 
The prototype-willingness model further contends that individuals' reported willingness to 
perform a behavior like drunk driving will be more malleable than their reported intention to 
do so. Because people have not adequately considered risk behaviors, their willingness can 
be changed more easily than their (relatively stable) intentions. It is likely, therefore, that 
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exposure to certain influences can either increase or decrease young adults' willingness more 
so than their intention to drink and drive. 
Rational Models and Risky Driving Research 
The theory of reasoned action has been applied to numerous behaviors, including 
risky driving. In particular, Parker, Manstead, and their colleagues have examined the role of 
intention in unsafe driving. For example, Lawton, Parker, Stradling, & Manstead (1997) 
asked participants to rate their intention to speed in different circumstances, such as on 
highways or busy city streets. Speeding was defined one of two ways, driving 10 miles over 
the speed limit or driving 33% over the speed limit ( e.g., participants read a situation in 
which they were driving either 60 or 67 miles per hour on a road with a 50 mile per hour 
limit). Lawton et al. found that, although the level of speeding depended on the specific 
situation (i.e., people reported they intended to drive faster on highways than on city streets), 
intention to speed was the norm. Young adults were more likely than other age groups to 
intend to speed. 
Because, as noted earlier, DUI frequently involves passengers, it is important to 
examine the influence of others on risk behavior. In a study that measured actual behavior, 
the presence of others was found to significantly affect drivers' behavior (Baxter, Manstead, 
Stradling, Campbell, Reason, & Parker, 1990). Experimenters patrolled a stretch of highway, 
observing the behavior of cars that contained drivers who were either alone or with a 
passenger. They found that, in general, younger drivers drove faster than older ones. More 
interesting, drivers with older female passengers performed the fewest unsafe driving 
behaviors. Those with younger male passengers performed more unsafe behaviors, although 
this number was not statistically different from those with other passenger types (i.e., older 
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males and younger females) or solo drivers. The authors suggest that older female and 
younger male passengers represent exemplars of safe and unsafe driving behaviors, 
respectively, and their presence in the car influences the driver by making social norms about 
either safe or risky driving more salient. 
In another study, the theory of planned behavior was used to predict intention to drive 
while intoxicated (Parker, Manstead, Stradling, Reason, & Baxter, 1992). Perceived control 
( defined as ease in avoiding driving after drinking) was negatively related to intention, so 
that intention to drive drunk was stronger when perceived control was low. Lack of control 
implies passivity and diminished responsibility. In a similar vein, the prototype-willingness 
model suggests that people sometimes react to social situations without much contemplation 
of consequences. Because they are reacting to circumstances rather than engaging in 
premeditated behavior, people should tend to feel diminished responsibility in the situation. 
Contrast this approach with reasoned action and expectation, which involve more thought 
and planning, and therefore greater acceptance of responsibility. Because intention and 
expectation involves more thought and responsibility, it should be less successful than 
willingness at predicting group risk behaviors like DUI (Gibbons et al., in press). 
Attribution of Responsibility 
Because risk-taking brings with it the potential for negative consequences, 
determining responsibility for these consequences becomes important. Deciding that one is 
not responsible ( or only partly so) for the decision may help an individual justify a risky 
decision to drive drunk. Presumably, group processes play an important role in this 
attribution process. 
7 
Research on the effect of alcohol use on attributions of responsibility is mixed. Legal 
cases have often used drunkenness as a mitigating factor for criminal behavior, and some 
experimental research has supported this external attribution (Critchlow, 1983). In a study 
on judgments of responsibility that varied both the presence of alcohol and road conditions in 
its hypothetical scenarios, participants assigned the most responsibility to drivers only when 
they had been drinking alcohol and road conditions were safe (Pliner & Cappell, 1977). 
When road conditions were described as poor, participants did not hold drivers more 
responsible if they were drinking alcohol than if they were drinking coffee. In a different 
study, when participants were asked to assign responsibility in drunk-driving scenarios that 
varied the driver's blood alcohol level, assignment of responsibility was uniformly high (De 
Joy, 1987). Although participants placed responsibility on the intoxicated driver regardless 
of alcohol level, clearly external factors such as poor road conditions did decrease 
attributions of responsibility to the driver. Despite their uniform responsibility attributions, 
when asked to decide on punishment, participants were more lenient when drivers had lower 
blood alcohol levels. Participants in another study of responsibility judgments assigned 
greater responsibility in scenarios that had more serious consequences (De Joy & Klippel, 
1984). When unsafe behavior such as speeding while intoxicated led to a collision, drivers 
were assigned more blame than when it led to a near miss. The perceived seriousness of 
drinking and driving depended on both consequence severity and amount of unsafe behavior. 
Drivers in near-miss accidents who had been drinking but not speeding were not judged as 
more responsible than sober drivers involved in near misses. 
This research suggests that people consider alcohol as one variable among many 
when making responsibility attributions. A variable for which the actor is obviously 
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responsible, such as alcohol consumption, contributes to assignment of responsibility to the 
individual, but mitigating circumstances or the lack of negative consequences can offset this 
attribution. 
In the above studies, participants were detached observers making judgments about 
hypothetical drivers. Attribution of responsibility may be more clear-cut when people 
contemplate their own behavior. Some evidence exists to support the idea that individuals 
change their attributions of responsibility when the circumstances are personal. When people 
make attributions to a hypothetical other person, they tend to make internal attributions for 
risky decisions (Forgas, 1982). However, when evaluating both their own and others' 
driving behavior, people often make the fundamental attribution error (the failure to consider 
external influences on others' behavior) in that they view others' driving as dispositionally 
determined, while viewing their own reckless driving as situationally determined (Baxter, 
Macrae, Manstead, Stradling, & Parker, 1990). Participants in studies might make different 
responsibility attributions if they consider their own behavior rather than the behavior of a 
hypothetical driver. For instance, people might make external attributions about their own 
actions in order to justify behavior they know is risky. 
Group Decision Making, Risk, and Responsibility 
One factor that influences how responsibility attributions are made is who is making 
the decision, the actor or an observer. Therefore, attributions about group decisions should 
also depend on who is perceived as the decision-maker. 
Most of the earliest research on group processes and risk-taking centered on the group 
polarization effect. When participants in groups were told to advise someone in a 
hypothetical scenario, their advice was riskier than when participants individually gave 
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advice (Vinokur, 1971). Originally, it was believed group diffusion ofresponsibility caused 
this "risky shift" (Bern, Wallach, & Kogan, 1965). Researchers also began to see evidence 
for a conservative shift in certain situations, and so the term group polarization was coined 
(Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969). Groups polarize in the sense that their average response to a 
scenario after group discussion is more extreme in the same direction as the average of their 
pre-discussion responses. 
One of the primary causes of group polarization is normative influence, in which 
people shift their attitudes to conform with the perceived attitudes of the rest of their group 
(Myers & Lamm, 1976; Kaplan & Miller, 1987). If the group is concerned with member 
satisfaction and subjective judgments, such as a group of friends might be, then normative 
influence processes will polarize attitudes, possibly to make a riskier decision (Kaplan, 
1989). This form of influence typifies the situation in which risk behaviors such as DUI 
would occur. A decision to drive drunk after a party may occur at least partly because of 
normative social influence, with attitudes polarizing toward greater risk. Social influence 
from peers has been a frequent subject of study by researchers interested in health-risk 
behaviors, and it is generally acknowledged to increase risk-taking (Graham, Marks, & 
Hansen, 1991; Nadler & Fisher, 1992). However, social influence is not the only group 
process that affects risk-taking. Groups make attributions, as well. 
An important group attribution process is diffusion of responsibility, in which an 
individual's perceived personal responsibility decreases in the presence of others (Leary & 
Forsyth, 1987; Latane & Nida, 1981). For example, in a study in which both individuals and 
groups witnessed a crime, members of a group were much less likely than individuals to 
report thinking about their obligation to help the crime victim and much more likely to report 
10 
thoughts about reduced responsibility (Schwartz & Gottlieb, 1976). Similarly, in group 
polarization research, participants who completed group discussions afterward reported 
feeling less accountable for the decisions made (Vinokur, 1971 ). The research on group 
diffusion of responsibility has not emphasized health-related risk-taking behavior. Instead, 
research in this area has been predominantly concerned with how groups lower their 
perceived responsibility for helping others or doing an equitable amount of work ( e.g., 
Latane & Darley, 1970; Williams, Harkins, & Latane, 1981). 
It is important to distinguish what type of responsibility is being diminished or 
diffused. One of the confusing aspects of diminished responsibility, as it pertains to groups 
making decisions about driving, is that there are two types of responsibility that can be 
diminished. Responsibility for the decision (to drive or not to drive after drinking) is 
different from responsibility for the potential outcomes (such as an automobile accident 
caused by drinking). Although the two are clearly related, they are distinct. Decision 
responsibility is affected by group membership; responsibility for the decision is diffused 
through the entire group, and is diminished relative to a single individual who bears full 
responsibility for a decision. This process may be thought of as a sort of "social loafing" 
type of decision making. Social loafing is the phenomenon whereby individuals in groups 
put less effort into a task than individuals alone (Latane, Williams, & Harkins, 1979). For 
example, people rating written passages have been shown to put less cognitive effort into the 
activity when part of a group than when alone (Petty, Harkins, Williams, & Latane, 1977). 
Similarly, in a decision-making task, individuals each contribute less effort in making the 
decision (Henningsen, Cruz, & Miller, 2000). This decreased effort presumably would lead 
to a diminished sense of responsibility for that decision. 
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This is different from outcome responsibility, which is not a function of group 
membership so much as role in the group. In a group, the person with the greatest control 
over the situation will have more responsibility for any negative outcomes than will others in 
the group. Taking an example of two people in a car, the person in the role of the driver 
would have more responsibility for avoiding accidents than would the person in the role of 
the passenger. This process is related to attribution of responsibility, in which people make 
judgments about the cause of events based on, among other things, whether they are 
controllable (Weiner, 1993). If an individual is perceived to have control over an event (an 
internal attribution), that individual will assume greater responsibility for the outcome of the 
event than someone who does not have control (an external attribution). 
Both diminished decision responsibility and diminished outcome responsibility can 
increase risk-taking. In general, people who feel diminished responsibility will have more 
malleable attitudes. Behavioral willingness is particularly sensitive when people are forced 
to react to circumstances, especially when personal responsibility has been reduced (Gibbons 
et al., in press). People, particularly passengers, may acquiesce to the perceived will of the 
group, agreeing to a decision to drive that they might not make on their own and letting a 
potentially intoxicated driver take responsibility for the situation. Imagine the following 
situation: you are a young adult with a group of friends, deciding what to do after a party, 
when someone suggests driving around to look for another party. You might not have 
volunteered this idea on your own, but when someone else suggests it, it sounds reasonable. 
Furthermore, it's not your car, so you feel relieved of most of the responsibility for the 
decision; if somebody else wants to drive, who are you to stand in the way? Group influence 
and diminished responsibility increase your willingness to consider this activity, which 
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causes you to be swept into a potentially dangerous activity you would not have initially 
chosen. 
Some research suggests that, when drivers are making decisions, they follow a 
different psychological process involving personal control. At their most basic level, 
perceptions of personal control are beliefs that one can respond in a way that will influence 
the outcome of the event (Thompson, 1981 ). Research shows that people are more likely to 
accept risks associated with voluntary activities than with involuntary ones (Van der Pligt, 
1996). One reason for this risk acceptance may be that voluntary risks are perceived as safer 
because they are under personal control. Control, in tum, leads to an optimistic bias about 
the likelihood of a negative outcome (Harris, 1996; Weinstein, 1989). For example, most 
people believe they are better at driving (Svenson, 1981 ), and less likely to have an accident 
(McKenna, 1993) than the average person. This confidence appears to spring from feelings 
of heightened control (McKenna, 1993), and in fact one study suggests that people are more 
likely to take risks when they imagine they are the driver than when they imagine they are 
the passenger (Horswill & McKenna, 1999). 
In the study by Horswill and McKenna (1999), participants watched a video monitor 
that simulated a driving experience as seen through the windshield, and reported whether 
they personally would drive faster or slower than depicted in the video. Participants who 
were told to imagine they were drivers indicated they would drive faster in real life than 
those who were told to imagine they were passengers. Manipulating driver status changes 
outcome responsibility as well as perceived control, but it leads to opposite predictions. 
Under the control hypothesis, drivers feel enhanced control over the situation, decreasing the 
perceived likelihood of any negative outcomes, and thus are more likely to take risks, while 
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passengers feel less control and are thus risk averse. Under the responsibility hypothesis 
proposed in the current study, drivers feel enhanced responsibility for any negative outcomes, 
making them less likely to take risks, while passengers feel diminished responsibility, 
making them prone to take risks. One resolution of these competing hypotheses may lie in 
social influence effects. Horswill and McKenna did not examine social influence, and their 
two conditions differed on more than just driver status. Although passengers would assume 
there was another person in the car (the driver), drivers may or may not have assumed there 
were others present in the car. The presence of others is presumed necessary for drivers to 
feel enhanced responsibility for the outcome; the driver has responsibility for several lives, 
while the passenger does not have this worry. 
Because of the social nature of risk behavior among young adults, group processes 
are a logical and important research direction. Drinking is a social activity for young adults, 
usually done with others (Beck & Summons, 1987; Schulenberg et al., 1999). Adolescents 
report that one of the primary reasons for drinking is to "have a good time with friends" 
(O'Malley, Johnston, & Bachman, 1998, p. 92). It is not surprising, therefore, that one of the 
strongest predictors of alcohol use is peer use (Klitzner, Vegega, & Gruenewald, 1988). As 
previously mentioned, drinking and driving is often a group activity as well (Thombs, 1999; 
O'Malley & Johnston, 1999). Given that behaviors like alcohol use and drunk driving are 
frequently performed by people in groups, it seems logical that the group might have an 
effect on risk-taking that would not be evident from studying lone individuals. 
Understanding how groups arrive at decisions that can put their health at risk might help 
explain many types of risk behavior among young adults. 
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Surprisingly, no published experimental research has been conducted in which groups 
make decisions about drinking and driving. Likewise, very little research has been done on 
diminished responsibility and health-related risk behavior. In light of the dearth of research, 
a logical area to study is how group membership and driver status affect risk attitudes. 
Obviously, it is impractical and unethical to manipulate actual drinking and driving 
behaviors. It must be done either using retrospective measures, as in survey research, or 
hypothetical situations in experimental research. To successfully study DUI in an 
experimental setting, the participant needs to experience high levels of experimental and 
mundane realism. In other words, what is needed is a realistic and interesting scenario, with 
the actual presence of a group, that nonetheless provides control and manipulation of the 
variables. One aspect that most previous DUI studies have ignored is the problem of social 
desirability or demand characteristics. Most young people know they are not supposed to 
drive after drinking alcohol, so there exists the likelihood that they will tell the experimenter 
what they think is the appropriate answer. Furthermore, many individuals do not like to be 
told what to do, and might interpret such a study as an infringement on their freedom, a form 
ofreactance (Brehm, 1966). Reactance can cause people to assert their free will by doing the 
opposite of what they perceive is the study's purpose (Eggleston, 1997). Therefore, to 
counter both social desirability and reactance tendencies in subjects, the successful 
experiment should camouflage its true purpose. 
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THE CURRENT STUDY 
Overview 
This study examined diminished responsibility in groups by assigning participants to 
one of three conditions. The difference between conditions lay in whether participants 
perceived they were in a group or alone (leading to a difference in decision responsibility), 
and if they were in a group, whether they were the driver or the passenger (leading to a 
difference in outcome responsibility). 
In pretesting sessions, participants completed a questionnaire that assessed their 
previous binge drinking and drinking-and-driving. Since those who binge drink are at greater 
risk for driving drunk, participants were recruited on the basis of past alcohol use. In the 
laboratory, participants went through a visualization exercise, suggested activities they would 
perform in the visualized situation, evaluated others' suggested activities, and reported their 
willingness and expectation to drive after drinking. Participants were told the study was 
cosponsored by business researchers, and involved decision making and entertainment 
product preferences; as part of the study, they would be asked to consider a recreation 
situation designed to be typical for college students. This cover story was designed to divert 
attention from the true purpose, and thus to minimize any social desirability tendencies 
among participants. The visualization exercise was vivid, detailed, and carefully designed to 
fit the cover story. The cover story's purpose was to convey the relevant alcohol and driving 
information without giving away the true purpose of the study. Participants visualized 
themselves going to a party. Both alcohol use and the availability of a car were included in a 
detailed narrative describing the events of the party. 
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To manipulate responsibility attributions, participants were assigned to one of three 
conditions: driver, passenger, or alone. Responsibility for both the decision and the outcome 
of that decision were manipulated. In the driver and passenger conditions, participants were 
told they were part of an actual group making a collective decision in a simulated situation. 
Group interaction was tightly controlled and made equivalent across conditions. The 
difference between the two group conditions lay in who was responsible for driving, and 
therefore responsible for any negative outcomes that might arise from driving ( e.g., 
accidents). In the driver condition, participants were told the available car belonged to them, 
implying they would be the drivers, and in the passenger condition participants were told the 
available car belonged to a friend, implying they would be passengers. Driver status is 
assumed to enhance, and passenger status is assumed to reduce, perceived responsibility for 
negative outcomes. Obviously, the presence of a group differentiates these two conditions 
from the alone condition. The presence of others during the decision-making should lead to 
diminished sense of responsibility for the decision that is made, relative to the alone 
condition. In the alone condition, participants made decisions by themselves so both 
decision responsibility and responsibility for negative outcomes was high. Individuals in the 
alone condition received almost identical information as individuals in the group conditions. 
Participants rated and rank-ordered all activities, and reported their willingness and 
expectation to perform each activity. 
Predictions 
Predictions are organized according to the dependent measures. The primary measure 
was willingness, and it is discussed most extensively. Two related processes are believed to 
be at work, social influence and responsibility. The presence of a group leads to group 
17 
suggestions being influential, and diminishes the perceived responsibility for decisions. In 
this study, the effect of social influence (found in the group versus alone conditions) should 
be more powerful than responsibility effects (found more subtly in the passenger versus 
driver conditions). The driver/passenger manipulation determines whether responsibility for 
the outcome is enhanced or diminished. 
Willingness. Participants in the passenger condition were predicted to report the 
most willingness to drive after drinking, because they experience a diminished sense of 
responsibility for both the decision and the outcome. Diminished decision responsibility is a 
form of social influence from being part of a group. Group decisions are arrived at 
collectively, and responsibility for the decision is shared (and therefore diminished). In 
addition, several activities are suggested by other group members, heightening the sense of 
group pressure; the fact that at least one person wants to do the activity should influence (and 
elevate) willingness. As passengers, participants lack any control over the driving situation, 
so their responsibility for anything that goes wrong is less than that in the other conditions. 
Participants in the driver condition should report less willingness to perform high-risk 
activities than those in the passenger condition, but more than those in the alone condition. 
Drivers will feel the effects of social influence and diminished decision responsibility, just as 
passengers do; the responsibility for the decision is truly shared, just as it is in the passenger 
condition. At the same time, it seems logical that the owner of the car frequently would have 
more influence in any decision that involves driving; if they don't want to go somewhere, 
they can always refuse to drive. This increased influence over the decision necessarily leads 
to some increase in the responsibility for the decision, compared to non-drivers. 
Additionally, drivers bear much more responsibility than passengers for any negative 
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outcomes, such as accidents. The combination of social influence, marginally higher 
decision responsibility and substantially higher outcome responsibility (relative to 
passengers) should lead participants in the driver condition to report less willingness to 
perform high-risk activities than participants in the passenger condition. 
Those in the alone condition will report the least willingness to perform any activities. 
They will feel both types of enhanced responsibility, decision and outcome. As the sole 
decision-maker, they cannot be lulled ( or bullied) into accepting a decision they would not 
support, so they have the greatest sense of responsibility for the decision among the three 
groups. Social influence effects will predominate (i.e., have the strongest impact on 
participants in this study), being stronger than responsibility effects. Without a group, 
participants will not experience any social influence that might increase their willingness to 
perform group-suggested activities. Likewise, as the driver, they alone are responsible for 
any negative outcomes. This absence of group influence and enhanced sense of 
responsibility will make participants in this condition report lower levels of willingness to 
perform high risk activities than those in the other conditions. 
Expectation. Expectations to perform behaviors in the future such as driving after 
drinking should be less malleable than willingness to perform them. As discussed earlier, 
expectation reflects more rational and planful thought processes, with greater commitment 
and less spontaneity than willingness. Because of these qualities, expectations would 
presumably be less affected by social influence and responsibility manipulations than would 
willingness. Therefore, expectations for all activities should vary less as a function of 
condition than willingness. 
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Attractiveness ratings. Participants' ratings of the desirability of activities will 
mirror their willingness ratings. In the same way they affected willingness, differences in 
social influence and responsibility will lead to differences in perceived attractiveness of 
activities. Therefore, those in the passenger condition will rate high..:risk activities as more 
attractive than those in the driver condition, who will rate them higher than those in the alone 
condition. For the same reasons, passengers will rank-order high-risk activities before low-
risk activities. 
Riskiness of decision. The closest this study can come to a behavioral outcome is the 
activity participants would choose as their decision. It seems likely that rating an activity as 
attractive, and being willing to perform it, would translate into a greater likelihood of 
choosing that activity. Therefore, decision choice was predicted to mirror willingness and 
attractiveness ratings: participants in the passenger condition would be most likely, and 





Estimating an appropriate sample size was difficult because few similar studies exist. 
Several studies did ask participants to consider driving-related scenarios, but either used very 
different dependent measures or did not provide enough information for sample size 
determination. Lawton et al. (1997) assessed intention to speed on different types of roads 
(residential streets, highways, etc.). Among the five conditions there were seven 
significantly different pairs; with a mean effect size of 0.63. At 80% power and .05 alpha 
level, the necessary sample was 38 per condition. Because comparing the current study to 
Lawton et al. is problematic (the conditions and situation are quite different), 48 participants 
per condition were eventually recruited. A post hoc power analysis of Horswill and 
McKenna (1999) suggested that a larger sample might have been advisable. Horswill and 
McKenna asked participants to imagine themselves as either drivers or passengers in a 
driving simulator, assessed the speed participants believed they would drive in that situation, 
and found an effect size of 0.50. At 80% power and .05 alpha level, the necessary sample 
was 64 per condition. 
Participants 
A total of 145 college students in introductory-level psychology courses were 
recruited as participants. Students in these classes had the option of completing 
questionnaires in a pretesting session that qualified them to participate in studies for 
additional extra credit. Only students who reported drinking 4 or more alcoholic drinks in a 
single setting during the last 6 months were recruited for the experiment. 
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When questioned at the end of the study, 11 participants (7.6% of the total) 
spontaneously reported suspicion that the study concerned drinking and driving; these 
participants were dropped from analyses. The remaining participants, totaling 134, were 
evenly distributed among the conditions. See Table 1. 
Pretesting 
Participants in the pretesting session completed questions that assessed past 
behavior. A question asking how often in the past six months participants had more than 
four alcoholic beverages in a single episode was used to assess drinking behavior. Past 
drinking-and-driving behavior was assessed with a question asking how many times in the 
past six months participants had driven after drinking three or more alcoholic beverages. 
Both questions used a five-point scale with endpoints of "never" and "more than 5 times." 














Appendix A has an outline of the study procedure. Upon arriving at the laboratory, 
participants heard a brief introduction and gave their consent to take part in the study. The 
experimenter told participants that they were part of a decision-making study in which they 
would be asked to visualize themselves in one of several situations that might typically 
happen to college students. No mention was made of drunk driving or any health-related 
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behaviors. Instead, the experimenter explained that the Business School was co-sponsoring 
the study, and that participants would be imagining themselves in different situations 
involving entertainment options and product preferences, and making decisions about those 
situations. It was emphasized that the situations were designed to be realistic depictions of 
how college students spent their leisure time. In the group conditions, the experimenter told 
participants that an additional goal of the study was to examine group decision processes. In 
order to examine group processes, participants were told they would be communicating with 
their two partners via intercom to avoid being influenced by mannerisms and facial 
expressions. In the alone condition, participants were told simply that the goal of the study 
was to examine decision-making processes. 
The author and two female undergraduates were the experimenters. After explaining 
how to use the intercom system, experimenters played a tape recording over the intercom that 
reiterated the importance of actively imagining oneself in the scenario, and described the 
scenario. In the scenario, participants were told they went to a party, had three or four 
drinks, and subsequently needed to decide what to do after the party (See Appendix B). All 
participants in an experimental session were the same gender and in the same condition. In 
the group conditions, participants were told they went to the party with two friends, while in 
the alone condition they were told they went by themselves. In the driver and alone 
conditions, participants were told they had a car, implying they would be drivers. In the 
passenger condition, one of the participants' friends was described as having a car, implying 
the participant would be a passenger. 
Great care was taken to create a scenario that was not transparently assessing drunk 
driving, by including additional information that disguised the true purpose of the 
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experiment. For example, participants were led to believe the study involved entertainment 
and product preferences. Two key pieces of information were introduced in the scenario: 
alcohol use and mode of transportation. All additional information served only as 
camouflage and to provide psychological realism. Mentioning alcohol use in an experiment 
will always attract attention. However, the experimenter introduced the scenario by 
explaining it was designed to be a realistic representation of typical student experiences, with 
distinct details included to help the participants visualize themselves actually in the situation. 
The scenario was richly detailed, with the participant described as seeing and doing a variety 
of specific activities. In this context, alcohol consumption was only one of those many 
normal college student activities. The goal was to make alcohol use appear as a realistic, yet 
not focal, detail of a visualization exercise. Likewise, the availability of a car was mentioned 
as one detail in the narrative. 
After listening to the scenario, participants were told to generate two activities that 
they might want to perform after the party. When this task was completed, the experimenter 
told participants in the group conditions that, since communication and evaluation were part 
of decision-making, they would read their ideas to each other over the intercom. Upon being 
cued by the experimenter, participants read their activity ideas into the microphone. In 
reality, however, participants did not hear each others' ideas. Instead, all participants were 
cued to speak at the same time. They believed they were speaking individually because their 
microphones were inactive and their headphones muffled external sounds. When it was time 
for the other group members to speak, each participant actually heard a prerecorded tape 
instead of the other participants. One alleged group member on the recording suggested two 
high-risk ideas that involved driving and more alcohol consumption, and one group member 
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suggested two low-risk ideas that involved walking. The high risk activities were "I have 
some friends who live out on the west side of Ames and they usually party on Saturday night, 
so we could go there" and "we could just drive around and find another party- there's 
always a couple on a Saturday night that you hear about." These activities were labeled high 
risk because they involve both driving and the possibility of additional alcohol use. The low 
risk activities were "since we're so near campus, head over to the Towers and see if anything 
interesting is going on there" and "walk around Campustown and see who's around." These 
activities were labeled low risk because neither involved driving. In the alone condition, 
participants were given these activities, but told they were generated by previous participants, 
as examples of common responses. 
Next, the experimenter told participants in the group conditions that they were going 
to evaluate their group members' ideas. Each list was taken and (they were told) 
photocopied, then returned with copies of two other lists. Because everyone heard the same 
ideas from fictional group members, participants were given the same list of four activities to 
evaluate, in addition to their own. Participants rated all six ideas on seven point scales in 
terms of how enjoyable they thought each activity was, and how much they wanted to do that 
activity; the response scales for each question ranged from "not at all" to "very." These 
ratings were used to assess attractiveness of each activity. After rating each activity, 
participants rank ordered them so that the activity they most wanted to do was first, and the 
one they least wanted to do was last. In the alone condition, participants were told to rate and 
rank order activities generated by recent participants so that the researchers could determine 
the relative popularity of different activity ideas, otherwise they were given the same 
instructions and materials as participants in the group conditions. 
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Because this study was about decision-making, participants were told that the group 
had reached a decision. Ostensibly, experimenters used each group member's rank ordering 
of activities to determine the most popular activity. In reality, all participants were told that 
the activity "drive around and find another party" was the group choice. 
Finally, participants completed a decision-making questionnaire that included 
questions to assess willingness, expectation, and the success of the experimental 
manipulation. Only two manipulation checks were performed, because of concerns about 
raising suspicion levels. To measure diminished responsibility, participants were asked to 
indicate who was responsible for the decision on a five-point scale ranging from "totally 
mine" to "totally others." To assess whether participants noticed alcohol use, they were 
asked to list everything they ate and drank at the party. The willingness and expectation 
questions were based on the four activities that had supposedly been generated by other 
participants. The willingness questions began with the statement "suppose you were in the 
situation you just learned about," and asked how willing participants would be to do each of 
the four activities (i.e., drive to the house of a friend who usually has a party, drive around 
looking for a party, walk around the neighborhood, and walk over to.a residence hall). The 
expectation questions followed, and asked participants how likely was it that, in a situation 
similar to the one they had just imagined, they would perform each of the same four 
activities. The activities were hand written on the form by the experimenter to make it 
appear as if they had just been generated by participants. Each question had a seven-point 
response scale, from "not at all" to "very." To summarize, the dependent measures in this 
study, in chronological order, were attractiveness ratings, risk decision, rank ordering, 
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willingness, and expectation. At the end of the study, the experimenter probed for suspicion, 
described the true purpose of the study, and explained the need for deception. 
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RESULTS 
This section begins with a description of the sample and the manipulation checks, 
followed by sections detailing the analysis of each measure. Behavioral willingness and 
expectation are examined first, followed by analyses describing attractiveness, rank order of 
activities and the riskiness of participants' decisions. Willingness and expectation analyses 
are the focus of the section because they are believed to be the proximal antecedents of 
drinking-and-driving behavior, and hence the most important measures. Furthermore, they 
are the only dependent measures that were assessed after the participants learned the group 
decision, making these measures qualitatively different from the other measures. 
The Sample 
The sample was fairly similar to the typical students who participate in the 
Department of Psychology research pool. For comparison purposes, the descriptive statistics 
listed below for the research pool were taken from the Fall 2000 semester. Because only 
students who reported binge drinking were selected for this study, reported drinking habits 
differed between the current sample and the research pool. Students in the research 
participation pool reported, on average, 2 or 3 binge drinking episodes in the last 6 months, 
with 45% of the pool reporting more than 5 episodes. In contrast, students in the sample 
reported an average of 4 or 5 binge drinking episodes in the last 6 months, with 68% 
reporting more than 5 episodes. The difference in the number of binge drinking episodes was 
significant, !=9.52, 2<.001. However, reports of drinking-and-driving behavior were similar, 
with both samples reporting an average of one instance in the last 6 months; on a five point 
scale, the sample averaged 2.05, while the research pool averaged 1.87 (!=l.40, 2=.14). 
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Approximately 65% of the research participation pool and 55% of the sample reported no 
drinking and driving. 
Manipulation Checks 
Before completing willingness and expectation questions, participants were asked two 
questions to assess the success of the manipulations. Participants' assessment of 
responsibility for the decision was different among conditions, f(2,131)=33.03, 2<.001. 
Specifically, participants in the alone condition reported greater responsibility for making the 
decision than participants in either the passenger or driver conditions (!=7.30 and 6.32, 
2<.001, respectively). The difference in decision responsibility between passengers and 
drivers was not significant (!=0.62). Participants were also asked to list everything they 
consumed at the party described. Only two out of 134 (1.7%) did not list drinking beer. 
Analyses performed with and without these two (male) participants yielded comparable 
results; reported analyses include their data. 
Willingness and Expectation 
At the end of the study, participants responded to four willingness and expectation 
questions corresponding to the four suggested activities ( drive around and find another party, 
drive to a friend's house, walk around the neighborhood, and walk to a residence hall). The 
mean reported willingness to perform each activity is shown in Table 2. An examination of 
this table shows that participants in the alone condition had a consistently lower willingness 
to perform any of the activities. 
Upon reflection, it is likely that this difference between the alone and group 
conditions is an artifact of the desirability of doing any of these activities when alone. 
Specifically, the typical participant may have been less interested in engaging in the 
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Table 2. Mean willingness to perform high- and low-risk activities 
Passenger Driver Alone 
High-risk Willingness 
Drive and find another party 4.75 3.82 3.26 
(.23) (.31) (.23) 
Drive to friends' house 5.34 5.25 4.98 
(.19) (.24) (.22) 
Low-risk Willingness 
Walk around neighborhood 4.55 5.00 3.84 
(.26) (.23) (.29) 
Walk over to residence hall 4.35 4.66 4.26 
(.25) (.21) (.28) 
High-risk minus Low-risk Willingness 1.20 -0.59 0.14 
(.51) (.56) (.63) 
Note. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
suggested activities when alone because they were simply less enjoyable when by oneself 
than with friends. From the students' perspectives, it would be more interesting to drive 
around looking for a party, or walk around the neighborhood, with friends because of the 
social nature of these activities. By contrast, doing these same activities alone sounds boring 
and a little desperate. Participants in the alone condition may have reached the same 
conclusion, and therefore consistently reported less willingness to perform the activities. 
Because of this confound between desirability and social influence, the analyses will ignore 
the alone condition and focus on the differences between the group conditions. 
To simplify the analyses, the willingness data were reduced to a single index. 
Willingness to perform the two driving and the two walking activities were summed to form 
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separate high-risk and low-risk indices ( a=.62 and .66, respectively). The low-risk index 
was subtracted from the high-risk index to form a single measure of risk willingness. This 
index provides an overall sense of participants' willingness to engage in risky activities (i.e., 
driving after drinking) net their willingness to engage in safe activities. Following the same 
pattern, expectation to perform the high- and low-risk activities were combined to create 
separate indices (a=.62 and .66, respectively), which were subtracted from each other to 
form a risk expectation index. There were no significant gender effects for these indices, nor 
for any of the other dependent measures, so analyses ignore gender. 
It was predicted that risk willingness would be higher for those in the passenger 
condition than those in the driver condition, but expectation would be relatively stable 
between conditions. A repeated measures ANOV A, shown in Table 3, with condition as the 
between subjects factor and type of index as the within subjects factor revealed a significant 





















Note. The alone condition is not included in this analysis. Values enclosed in parentheses 
represent mean square errors. § = subjects. 
*2<.0S. 
31 
effect for condition, E(l,88)=4.36, g<.05, but not for type of index or condition by type. The 
univariate ANOV A for willingness likewise revealed a significant difference between 
conditions, f(l,88)=5.55, g<.05, with participants in the passenger condition reporting 
greater risk willingness than those in the driver condition, as anticipated (see Table 4). 
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Note. The alone condition is not included in this analysis. Values enclosed in parentheses 
represent mean square errors . .§=subjects. 
*p<.05. 
Finally, the univariate ANOVA for expectation revealed that the difference between 
conditions was not significant, f(l,89)=2.48, g=.12, although the means followed the same 
pattern of passengers reporting greater expectations than drivers (see Table 5). 
Activity Attractiveness 
The next prediction was that participants in the passenger condition would find the 
high-risk activities more attractive than participants in the driver condition. Participants 
made attractiveness ratings for each activity, by indicating how enjoyable they perceived and 
how much they wanted to perform each listed activity. Averaging these two questions (want 
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Table 5. Mean expectation to perform high- and low-risk activities 
Passenger Driver Alone 
High-risk Expectation 
Drive and find another party 4.79 4.02 3.56 
(.25) (.32) (.28) 
Drive to friends' house 5.38 4.77 4.88 
(.22) (.29) (.24) 
Low-risk Expectation 
Walk around neighborhood 4.75 5.05 4.49 
(.28) (.22) (.26) 
Walk over to residence hall 4.30 3.98 4.16 
(.29) (.27) (.33) 
High-risk minus Low-risk Expectation 1.11 -0.23 -0.21 
(.54) (.66) (.75) 
Note. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
and enjoyment) created rating indices for each activity (a>.85) with a range of 1 to 7. As 
before, the activities involving driving were summed and subtracted from the sum of the 
activities involving walking to create a single risk attractiveness index. Table 6 reports the 
mean attractiveness ratings for each condition. A univariate ANOV A found that participants 
in the passenger condition preferred high-risk activities more than participants in the driver 
condition, ~(1,89)=4.19, p_<.05 (see Table 7). 
Rank Order 
The next prediction was that participants in the passenger condition would rank high-
risk activities more highly than participants in the driver condition. This prediction was 
tested by examining the rank ordering of each activity. 
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Table 6. Mean attractiveness for experimenter-generated activities 
Passenger Driver 
High-risk Attractiveness 
Drive and find another party 4.20 3.51 
(.20) (.24) 
Drive to friends' house 5.23 5.39 
(.16) (.16) 
Low-risk Attractiveness 
Walk around neighborhood 4.01 4.47 
(.20) (.24) 
Walk over to residence hall 4.25 4.35 
(.21) (.24) 
High-risk minus Low-risk Attractiveness 1.18 0.08 
(.39) (.37) 
Note. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Table 7. Univariate analysis of variance for activity attractiveness 
Source 
Condition 


















Note. The alone condition is not included in this analysis. Value enclosed in parentheses 
represents mean square error. §=subjects. 
*p<.05. 
Participants rank ordered all six activities, with their most desired activity assigned 
the first place, and their least desired activity assigned the last place. Because the 
participant-generated activities would vary in risk level and attractiveness from one 
participant to the next, including these activities is problematic. Therefore, analyses were 
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performed using only the rank ordering of the researcher-generated activities, which were the 
same for all participants. The two participant-generated activities were deleted from the 
rankings, and the rankings of the four remaining activities were adjusted to create rankings 
from one to four. The mean rankings are shown in Table 8. Analysis of variance on each of 
the activities revealed that only the high-risk activity "drive around and find another party" 
was significantly different between conditions, f(l,81)=5.41, g<.05, with those in the 
passenger condition ranking the activity higher than those in the driver condition. 
Table 8. Mean rankings of experimenter-generated activities for group conditions 
Passenger Driver 
High-risk Activities 
Drive and find another party 2.60 3.07 
(.14) (.15) 
Drive to friends' house 1.81 1.71 
(.16) (.14) 
Low-risk Activities 
Walk around neighborhood 2.79 2.44 
(.19) (.19) 
Walk over to residence hall 2.81 2.78 
(.16) (.15) 
Note. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Decision Riskiness 
The final prediction was that participants in the passenger condition would be more 
likely to make high-risk decisions (those involving driving), and participants in the driver 
condition would be more likely to make low-risk decisions (those not involving driving). To 
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determine how condition affected riskiness of decisions, all activities were converted to 
binary responses. Two raters evaluated the responses generated by participants and coded 
them as either involving driving (high risk) or not involving driving (low risk). Agreement 
between the two raters was high (correlation >.86 for each of the two activities). 
Discrepancies between the raters were resolved by the principal investigator, who was blind 
to condition at the time. The activities provided by the fictional participants were also coded 
as high or low risk, with the two activities involving driving (drive to friend's house, drive 
around and find another party) labeled high-risk, and the two activities involving walking 
(head over to a residence hall, walk around neighborhood) labeled low-risk. Participants 
made their decision by choosing an activity to be their first choice; 35% of the sample chose 
a high-risk activity. Table 9 shows the number of high- and low-risk decisions for each 
condition. A chi-square analysis of contingency revealed no difference in decision riskiness 
between conditions, x2 (1,N=82)=1.19. 


















The data in this study suggest that people who believed they would not be driving 
were more open to performing high-risk activities than people who believed they would be 
driving. Participants in the passenger condition were more willing to perform high-risk 
activities, and rated those activities as more attractive than participants in the driver 
condition. Furthermore, willingness varied significantly as a function of condition, whereas 
expectation did not, providing support that willingness and expectation are distinct 
constructs. 
Diminished outcome responsibility can be clearly seen in the finding that passengers 
are more likely than drivers to favor high-risk activities. Although social influence could 
account for any differences between group and alone conditions, it would not explain the 
difference between the passenger and driver conditions. If the only distinction between the 
driver and passenger conditions is driver status, this status must be causing any differences in 
willingness and attractiveness between the conditions. Differences cannot be caused by social 
influence, since groups are present in both conditions, providing the same suggested 
activities. Likewise, it is not caused by decision responsibility, since no evidence of such a 
difference was found between conditions. Passengers, by virtue of not controlling the 
automobile, have less responsibility for any automobile-related outcomes (e.g., accidents or 
arrests). Therefore, this study suggests that passengers prefer high-risk activities because 
they feel less responsible for the outcome, and drivers prefer low-risk activities because they 
feel more responsibility. 
The patterns of results, passengers reporting higher risk willingness than drivers, does 
not support the argument that drivers feel more control than passengers, leading to greater 
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risk behavior. One problem in sorting out responsibility and control in the current study is 
that the two concepts are confounded. Drivers who are ferrying passengers have both 
heightened control (they are driving) and heightened outcome responsibility (they are 
responsible for the safety of their passengers). Passengers, on the other hand, have low 
control and diminished outcome responsibility. Although one might argue that the initial 
decision to get in the car makes passengers partially responsible for any negative outcomes 
they experience, drivers would still be given the majority of outcome responsibility. Control 
and responsibility are naturally confounded in any study that compares drivers and 
passengers, and cannot be easily separated. 
Limitations 
Some questions and concerns may be raised about this study._ The limitations of this 
study may be summarized as confounding the group/alone differences with activity 
attractiveness differences, failing to measure outcome responsibility cognitions and 
manipulations adequately, not clarifying alcohol use in the described situation, and using ad 
hoc measures of willingness and expectation that were not counterbalanced in order. 
How did participants in the alone condition perceive the activities? It seems likely, as 
stated earlier, that participants in the alone condition would be less interested than those in 
other conditions in any of the experimenter-generated activities because these activities are 
social in nature. This confound, realized after the data was collected, necessitated dropping 
the alone condition from any analyses and made it impossible to determine what effect 
varying decision responsibility had on risk-taking. 
Was outcome responsibility manipulated? Outcome responsibility was not clearly 
measured in the study. Because participants were not asked any questions about their 
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perceived responsibility for any negative outcomes, it is not clear whether the driver-
passenger manipulation, or some unknown cognition, affected responsibility for the outcome. 
What is needed are measures that ask participants their perceived level of responsibility for 
making the decision and for any negative outcomes that occur because of that decision. 
Were passengers putting themselves at risk? The scenario does not explicitly state 
that the participants' friends were drinking. Although it seems unlikely, it is certainly 
possible that participants assumed that one of the imagined friends was a designated driver. 
Unfortunately, to make this assumption is still quite risky: the participants only know that 
they have been drinking, they do not know who has not been drinking. This thought process 
may very well occur in actual drinking situations: the intoxicated passengers abdicate 
responsibility and let the driver worry about getting them home safely. Obviously, this tactic 
becomes high-risk if the driver has also been drinking. Even people who regularly employ 
designated driver tactics are at risk, because designated drivers frequently do not abstain 
from alcohol (Barr & MacK.innon, 1998; Glascoff, Knight, & Jenkins, 1994). 
Are willingness and expectation really distinct? It was predicted that expectation 
would not vary between conditions, while willingness would vary. Although this prediction 
was basically born out, the results should be viewed with caution. The chief concern is the 
lack of a condition by question-type interaction, which one would expect if willingness was 
responsive to condition manipulation but expectation was stable. Furthermore, this study 
used ad hoc willingness and expectation measures, presented consecutively. The willingness 
questions were always answered before the expectation questions. It may be argued that 
when asking two sets of similar questions, the first set will provide the only "clean" 
responses; in this case, participants responded thoughtfully to the willingness measures but 
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their responses to the expectation measures were contaminated because they came second. 
For example, participants might find it difficult to report high willingness in the first set of 
questions but low expectation in the second set. If the study had used standard questions 
(i.e., those used in other published studies) that were counterbalanced and separated by other 
questions, participants may have responded differently. 
Follow-up Study 
A follow-up study could address these limitations. The basic protocol, a decision 
making task that led people to believe they were interacting with fictional group members 
about an entertainment decision, was successful. The cover story was believable and led 
most people to respond to the risky activities without concerns about social desirability. The 
follow-up could use a similar design, but provide activities that would be equally attractive 
for people alone or in a group. Perhaps the activities would be done as part of a group in 
both cases, but transportation would occur either alone or with others. The described 
situation would need to clearly state that all group members were drinking. Participants 
would answer questions assessing alcohol use, driver status, responsibility for the decision, 
and responsibility for various negative outcomes. Disentangling willingness and 
expectations would require more than just using the same, standard measures pre- and post-
manipulation. The cleanest way to determine differences between the two measures would 
be to create a new independent variable, with half the participants answering willingness 
questions and the rest answering expectation questions at the end of the study. 
The Meaning of Risk for Drivers and Passengers 
Despite the need for a follow-up, this study contains several strengths, and makes a 
novel contribution to the health-related risk taking literature. An examination of reckless 
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driving research over the past 20 years revealed no published journal articles that 
experimentally studied social influence or diminished responsibility, let alone both together. 
Furthermore, the few published driving-related studies that were not correlational did not 
disguise their true purpose, leading to results that may have been affected by social 
desirability: drinking and driving, especially, is widely condemned by society, so 
participants may be tempted to respond as they think they should rather than as they actually 
would in a real situation. This study reduced this problem by creating a believable cover 
story and discarding the data of the few participants who were suspicious. 
One theme emerges clearly from this study. Risk-taking varies according to the risk-
taker's role. Passengers and drivers interpret the risk in similar situations differently, leading 
to different levels of risk. Passengers appear to be the most at-risk: they have higher risk 
willingness than drivers, presumably because of diminished responsibility over potential 
outcomes. Even though they may not have chosen to perform a high-risk activity, people's 
willingness to consider such an activity leads them into as much danger as if they had made 
the conscious decision. Nowhere is this indirect path to risk better illustrated than in group 
driving situations, where intoxicated people can make what seems like a low-risk choice (not 
to drive) that nonetheless becomes a high-risk choice when the driver is also intoxicated. 
The indirect path to risk occurs because risk is interpreted differently and, it turns out, 
more dangerously, by passengers than by drivers. Everyone knows they are not supposed to 
drive after drinking, which is why drivers report low levels of risk willingness. In tum, 
intoxicated people believe they are making a low-risk decision when they hand over driving 
responsibility to someone else and become passengers. Public health campaigns rightly 
focus on the drunk driver, as this person is clearly the key to decreasing accidents. But more 
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emphasis needs to be made on riding with an intoxicated driver so that these risk-takers 
realize that they are in just as great danger as the much-maligned drunk driver (Dellinger, 
Bolen, & Sacks, 1999). Potential passengers need to be reminded that they, too, may be 
taking a risk, especially if they are not positive that their driver is sober. A public service 
announcement used to say "friends don't let friends drive drunk." Unfortunately, friends do 
let friends drive drunk, and sometimes they are in the car with that drunk driver. 
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APPENDIX A. OUTLINE OF EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE 
I. Participant Selection 
A. Pretesting session 
B. Recruitment for study 
IL Laboratory Study 
A. Introduction and informed consent 
B. Visualize situation 
C. Generate two activities 
D. Read own and hear fictional group's activities over intercom 
E. Receive written activities from fictitious group members 
F. Rate and rank-order all activities 
G. Learn group decision 
H. Complete manipulation check questions 
I. Complete willingness and expectation questions 
J. Experimenters probe for suspicion 
K. Experimenters debrief participants 
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APPENDIX B. DECISION-MAKING SCENARIOS 
Group Conditions Scenario 
It is a warm Saturday evening in September. 
You are at a fast-food restaurant with two friends, talking about what to do, when you 
decide to go to a party near where you live. **DRIVER CONDITION You get into your car 
and drive with your friends to your neighborhood, near campus. You park ... **OR 
**PASSENGER CONDITION You get into your friends' car and she[he] drives to your 
neighborhood, near campus. She[He] parks ... **in front of your place, and you and your 
friends walk down the street to the party. The party, in a building just off Welch, is crowded 
and appears to include two different apartments. The people throwing the party have a big 
stereo, and the music is pretty loud. Looking around, you estimate you know about half of 
the people there. 
You start off by eating a handful ofDoritos, and then have a small bowl of popcorn. 
Over the course of the next hour or so, you hang out in the living room, listen to music, have 
3 or 4 beers, eat some pretzels, play darts with some people in the kitchen, and talk to a lot of 
different people. 
While playing darts, you meet a couple of good-looking men[women]. You start 
talking to one of them, find out his[her] name is Matt[Lisa], and spend about a half-hour 
talking to him[her]. Eventually his[her] friends want to leave the party, but before he[ she] 
leaves you exchange phone numbers. After that, the party starts to die down, and you and 
your friends get bored. By 11 o'clock, you and your friends signal one another that it's time 
to leave, so the three of you head out the door .... 
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Alone Condition Scenario 
It is a warm Saturday evening in September. 
You are at a fast-food restaurant, thinking about what to do, when you decide to go to 
a party near where you live. You get in your car and drive to your neighborhood, near 
campus. You park in front of your place, and walk down the street to the party. The party, in 
a building just off Welch, is crowded and appears to include two different apartments. The 
people throwing the party have a big stereo, and the music is pretty loud. Looking around, 
you estimate you know about half of the people there. 
You start off by eating a handful ofDoritos, and then have a small bowl of popcorn. 
Over the course of the next hour or so, you hang out in the living room, listen to music, have 
3 or 4 beers, eat some pretzels, play darts with some people in the kitchen, and talk to a lot of 
different people. 
While playing darts, you meet a couple of good-looking men[ women]. You start talking to 
one of them, find out his[her] name is Matt[Lisa], and spend about a half-hour talking to 
him[her]. Eventually his[her] friends want to leave the party, but before he[she] leaves you 
exchange phone numbers. After that, the party starts to die down, and you get bored. By 11 
o'clock, you are ready to leave, so you head out the door .... 
45 
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